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LIST OF PARTIES
T.

Mark

Wolsey

and

Melissa

Wolsey

are

plaintiffs/

appellants. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems is defendant/
appellee.
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was a party in the district
court, but is not a party to this appeal, notwithstanding the
fact that no final disposition of plaintiffs7 claims against
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. has been made.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISD"
ISSUES

. APPEAL

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

. .

STATEMENT

:

STATEMENT

• RELEVANT FACTS . .

SUMMARY

-x ARGUMENT

ARGL ,'U : 1

POIN'
BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL
DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL CLAIMS OF ALL PARTIES, IT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL JUDGMENT AND THIS COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW IT
POINT II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BRIEF WERE
NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE WAS PROPER
All of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Were
Preempted by ERISA and Therefore
Dismissal With Prejudice Was Required
B.

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint With
Prejudice
1.

The Trial Court Had Concurrent
Jurisdiction Over ERISA Claims

ii

. .

Page
2.

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction
Because Plaintiffs Asserted Only
State Law Claims. Res Judicata
Prohibits Plaintiffs From Asserting
a New Claim Under ERISA

C.

Summary Judgment Was Also Appropriate
Based Upon the Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppel

D.

Plaintiffs' Claimed is Barred by the
Doctrine of Waiver

E.

No Disputed Issues of Material Fact
Exist

CONCLUSION

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases cited
Allen v. Allen. 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976)
Allen v. McCurrv. 449 U.S. 90 (1980)

34
.

30

Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall.
751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Banaerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983)
Belliston v. Texaco. Inc., 521 P.2d 379
(Utah 1974)
Bennion v. Pennzoil Company. 826 P.2d 137
(Utah 1992)

20
22
30
21

Browning v. Grote Meat Co.. 703 F. Supp. 790
(E.D. Mo. 1988)

28

Buchanan v. Hansen. 820 P.2d 908 (Utah 1991)
Carter v. Amax Coal Corp., 748 F. Supp. 812
(D. Utah 1990)
Christian v. American Home Assurance Co..
577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1977)
Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving
Co.. Inc.. 552 P.2d 796 (N.M. App. 1976)

2
23
29
34

Clegg v. Lee. 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348
(1973)

22

Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980)

33

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991)

22

Crosland v. Peck. 738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987)
Demond v. FHP. 849 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1993) . . . .
Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990)
Harris v. Bailev. 798 P.2d 96 (Mont. 1990)

iv

18
24, 25
30
36

Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co..
829 P. 2d 142 (Utah App. 1992)

33

Imler v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.. 650 P.2d 712
(Kan. App. 1982)

26

Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace.
559 P.2d 411, 413 (N.M. 1977)

30

Nichols v. State. 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976)

31

O'Neil v. Gen Corp.. Inc.. 764 F. Supp. 833
(S.D. N.Y. 1991)
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr.
791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990)

33

Pate v. Marathon Steel Company. 692 P.2d 765
(Utah 1984)

20

28

Penrod v. Nu Creation Cream. Inc..
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983)

30

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41 (1986)

...

23

Pratt v. Citv Council. 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981)

22

Provo City Corp. v. Cropper. 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972) . .

33

Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 496
(Utah App. 1992)
Rosa v. CWJ Contractors. Ltd., 664 P.2d 745

24

(Hawaii App. 1983)

33

Rosenberg v. Rosenberg. 601 P.2d 589 (Ariz. 1979) . . . .

33

Rowland v. Klies. 726 P.2d 310 (Mont. 1986)

34

Schaer v. State. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983)

22

Sneddon v. Graham. 821 P.2d 1185
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)

20

Steck v. Aagaire. 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990)

19

Steiner v. State. 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972)

31

v

Vali Convalescent & Care Institutions v. Div.
of Healthcare Financing, 797 P.2d 438
(Utah App. 1990)

39

Villeneuve v. Schamanek. 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981) . . . .

22

Wheadon v. Pearson. 376 P.2d 946 (Utah 1962)

30

White v. Enron Corp., 686 F. Supp. 582
(N.D. Tex. 1988)

26

Wilson v. Western Alliance Corp., 715 P.2d 1344
(Or. App. 1986)

30

Other Authorities Cited
29 U.S.C.A. § 1001-1461

3

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1985)

2

29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a)

23

29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)

23

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(3) (j)
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3 (2) (k)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 3(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b)

1
1
2, 18
24

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) . . . 1, 2, 13, 15,
18-21

VI

JURISDICTION
This court does not have jurisdiction because a final
judgment disposing of all claims has not been entered by the
district court.

Additionally, this matter was not certified

under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by the
district court.
Since a final judgment has not been entered disposing of
all claims against all parties, § 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code
and § 78-2a-3(2) (k) of the Utah Code do not confer jurisdiction
on the Utah Supreme Court or this Court.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Although plaintiffs vigorously contested the applicability
of

ERISA preemption

in the trial court, plaintiffs have

conceded on appeal that ERISA preemption does apply.

There-

fore, the issue before the court is not the applicability of
ERISA, but is instead the propriety of the court's judgment of
dismissal with prejudice, and this court's jurisdiction, if
any, to hear this appeal.

Specifically, the issues on appeal

are as follows:
1.

Since a final judgment disposing of plaintiffs'

claims against all parties has not been entered, and since the
trial court made no determination under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, does this Court have jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, or must the appeal be dismissed?
2.

Have plaintiffs raised new claims that cannot be

addressed on appeal?

1

3.

Was the judgment of dismissal with prejudice entered

by the trial court in favor of defendant Intercare Benefit
Systems (Intercare) and against plaintiffs proper?
These are legal determinations for which the trial court's
decision is accorded no particular deference, but rather is
reviewed for correctness. See Buchanan v. Hansen, 82 0 P. 2d 908
(Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
1.

Utah R. App. P. 3(a).

2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).

3.

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Plaintiffs filed a civil action

seeking to recover damages for alleged breach of an employee
medical benefit plan.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
filed

suit against

Plaintiffs

Intercare to recover medical

expenses

allegedly owing under an employee benefit plan, damages for
emotional distress, and punitive damages.

(R. 12). Defendant

answered by stating that, among other things, plaintiffs'
claims were preempted by ERISA.

(R. 18) . On January 14, 1992,

plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add Pro-Benefit
Staffing, Inc. (Pro-Benefit) as an additional named defendant
and to add additional common law claims.

(R. 23). The court

granted the motion to amend on February 18, 1992.
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(R. 176).

Defendant Intercare moved for summary judgment on January
22, 1992,

The basis for the motion was that the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1001-1461 preempted all claims asserted by plaintiffs in
their complaint and amended complaint.

(R. 44, 52).

Plaintiffs responded to Intercare's motion for summary
judgment on February 11, 1992. Plaintiffs argued ERISA did not
apply because T. Mark Wolsey (Wolsey) was not an employee of
Pro-Benefit, and that no employer-employee relationship was
ever entered into between Wolsey and Pro-Benefit.

(R. 166,

170) .
In

response

to

the

arguments

raised

by plaintiffs,

Intercare filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment.

(R. 185). Intercare argued that the plain-

tiffs' lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice because as a
matter of law if Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit as
plaintiff contended, plaintiffs were entitled to no benefits
under the medical benefit plan established by Pro-Benefit.
Oral argument on Intercare's motion took place before the
trial court on June 19, 1992.

Intercare, through counsel,

again requested that plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with
prejudice.

(R. 250-267).

advisement.
court

entered

(R. 200).

The court took the matter under

Subsequently, on July 7, 1992, the

its ruling.

(R. 201).

This

ruling

was

formalized when Judge Christensen entered a formal judgment on
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September 9, 1992, dismissing plaintiffs7 amended complaint
against Intercare with prejudice,

(R. 207).

On September 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend
the judgment, asking that the dismissal be without prejudice.
(R. 219). The motion was briefed by both sides.

On October

15, 1992, the court issued a ruling denying the motion.
240).

(R.

This ruling was formalized by an order signed by Judge

Christensen on November 3, 1992.

(R. 242).

During the time the foregoing was taking place, plaintiffs
sought and were granted leave of court to serve defendant ProBenefit by publication.

(R. 188-192).

Service by publication

was effected, and on September 15, 1992, Judge Christensen
signed a default certificate. (R. 216, 217). However, no judgment or order of any kind was ever entered by the trial court
in favor of plaintiffs and against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.
On November 10, 1992, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal
wherein they purported to appeal the final judgment entered by
Judge Christensen on September 9, 1992.

(R. 246).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Facts Pertaining to Intercare Benefit Systems.
1.

In September of 1991, plaintiffs, T. Mark Wolsey and

Melissa Wolsey, filed a complaint against Intercare.

The

complaint alleged that plaintiffs were entitled to medical
benefits under a medical benefit plan for medical expenses
Wolsey had incurred incident to medical treatment his daughter,
Melissa, had received after an accident.
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Plaintiffs also

sought punitive damages and damages for alleged emotional
distress.

(R. 12).

2.

Defendant

Intercare

answered

the

complaint

by

asserting that, among other things, plaintiffs' claims were
preempted by ERISA.
3.

(R. 21, see Fourth Defense).

On January 22, 1992, Intercare filed a motion for

summary judgment on the basis of ERISA preemption.

(R. 44).

Intercare supported its motion with a memorandum of points and
authorities and an affidavit from James Beardall (Beardall),
President of Intercare.

(R. 52, 109). Neither in the affidav-

it nor motion did Intercare specify whether the dismissal
should be with or without prejudice.

It simply asked for a

dismissal

and

of

plaintiffs'

complaint

proposed

amended

complaint.
4.

Beardall's affidavit in support of Intercare's motion

for summary judgment set forth several facts which were never
disputed.

Based upon the undisputed affidavit, it is clear

that Intercare was not, and had never acted as an insurance
company, it had never at any time insured plaintiffs, and it
had never entered into any contracts with plaintiffs. The role
of Intercare was simply to serve as the contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit's employee medical benefit plan.
Benefit was itself the administrator of the plan.

Pro-

(R. 107-

109) .
5.

On February 11, 1992, plaintiffs filed a memorandum

in opposition to Intercare's motion for summary judgment.
5

(R.

166).

Plaintiffs argued that ERISA did not apply as a bar to

plaintiffs7 complaint because Wolsey was not an employee of
Pro-Benefitf and accordingly, ERISA preemption was inapplicable.

Plaintiffs

made

this

point

repeatedly

in

their

memorandum in opposition to defendant Intercare/s motion for
summary judgment.

Examples follow:

In the statement of facts portion of their memorandum,
plaintiffs flatly state:

"Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was not

the employer of T. Mark Wolsey.
Wolsey."

See Affidavit of T. Mark

Plaintiffs then went on to say that Pro-Benefit did

not hire Wolsey, or sponsor an employee benefit plan.

(R. 166-

165) .
Under Point II of their argument, plaintiffs represented
to the trial court:
T. Mark Wolsey states in his affidavit
that Pro-Benefit was not his employer and
describes the relationship. The relationship had none of the characteristics of an
employer/employee relationship even though
Pro-Benefit held itself out as an employer. . . . In the instant case plaintiff
has pointed to conduct that shows the
agreement in the instant case was a sham
and subterfuge to conceal the true relationship between the parties. . . . ProBenefit exercised no control whatsoever
over T. Mark Wolsey and did not pay him a
wage or salary but merely returned to him
an amount given to it by him for his
salary as part of the agreement.
The
agreement was merely a facade to help ProBenefit appear to be an employer.
(R.
163) .
Under Point III of their memorandum, plaintiffs state:
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Defendant Intercare is not entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Pro-Benefit
is not an employer and therefore the ERISA
statute does not apply. . . . Plaintiff
claims that Pro-Benefit is not an employer
and that the insurance policy issued to
plaintiff was not an employee benefit
plan. (R. 162).
Plaintiffs concluded Point III of their memorandum by
again reiterating:
Pro-Benefit was not plaintiffs employer
and their insurance policy was not an
employee benefit plan.
Pro-Benefit's
attempt to hold themselves out as an
employer was merely a facade for their
insurance company activities.
Therefore
plaintiff's state claims are not barred by
ERISA. (R. 161).
6.

On February 2 6, 1992, defendant Intercare filed a

reply memorandum.

(R. 185). Intercare argued the case should

be dismissed due to ERISA preemption.

Intercare also argued

additional points in light of plaintiff's sworn affidavit.
Intercare argued the case should be dismissed because the plan
did not cover plaintiffs and because the doctrines of waiver
and

estoppel

precluded

plaintiff's

claims.

In

memorandum, Intercare wrote:
If Plaintiff denies that he is or
ever was an employee of Pro-Benefit, then
he was never eligible for participation in
the Plan, and is not currently eligible
for any benefit payments.
Accordingly,
under the clear terms of the Plan and its
contract with Pro-Benefit, Intercare would
be required to deny payment of the claims
in question. If, as Plaintiff claims, he
is not an employee, then he is not
entitled to Plan benefits, and his lawsuit
must be dismissed. (R. 180).
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its

reply

*

*

*

*

Plaintiff seeks to declare that he is not
an employee of Pro-Benefit. If this is in
fact the case, then he should never have
been enrolled in the Plan, and is ineligible for benefits, and his claims must be
denied as a matter of law. (R. 179).
*

*

*

*

Plaintiff never asserts that he was not
aware of the fact that he was enrolling in
an employee benefit plan. Characterized
as favorably as possible, his affidavit
asserts that he entered into a conspiracy
to defraud the Plan by allowing a nonemployee to be enrolled. He knew what he
was about and did it consciously. He now
seeks to obtain judgment under state law
against the only party in the case with no
role in the fraud. This action should be
dismissed for the reasons herein stated.
(R. 178).
7.

On June

Intercare's

motion

19, 1992, oral
for

summary

argument took

judgment.

At

place on
that

time

plaintiffs' counsel continued to maintain that Wolsey was not
an employee of Pro-Benefit, and there was no employee benefit
plan.

For example, plaintiffs7 counsel stated:
What I'm here to argue today is that there
was not an employee benefit plan.
And
also, as opposing counsel has offered his
argument, I also move for summary judgment
based upon that there are no material
issues of fact as to whether or not
there's an employee benefit plan.
The
facts that we have set out in this case by
affidavit of the plaintiff, Mark Wolsey,
is that Pro Benefit did not supervise his
work. They did not direct his work. They
did not direct the work of its employees.
They did not act in any way as an
employer. (R. 258).
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Plaintiffs' counsel continued to argue that Pro-Benefit was not
an employer and the effect,of the employee medical benefit plan
was fraudulent.

(R. 259).

Counsel argued that plaintiffs

could bring their common law claims in state court because no
employer-employee relationship existed between Wolsey and ProBenefit.

(R. 260). In summing up her argument, plaintiffs'

counsel stated:
The bottom line in this case is there are
no material issues of fact as to whether
or not Pro Benefit was an employer. The
uncontested facts specifically point out
that they were not an employer. And if
they were not an employer, then ERISA does
not apply and we are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. And the judgment as a
matter of law is that we can bring this
claim in the state court. (R. 261).
8.

At the hearing before the trial court on June 19,

1992, counsel for Intercare set forth the position of Intercare
as follows:
MR. BURTON: All right. First and
foremost is as a matter of contract law
this case needs to be dismissed. Plaintiff has filed a suit seeking medical
benefits under an employee benefit plan
under the Pro Benefit Employee Benefit
Plan.
Yet he has filed an affidavit
saying:
I'm not an employee of Pro
Benefit.
To that affidavit and to his
memorandum in opposition to this motion
he's attached a copy of the plan or the
agreement under which he seeks benefits.
And that agreement is very interesting in
the reading of the agreement.
The agreement says it's the summary
plan description for the employee benefit
plan.
And then it says on the initial
page, "The employer has initiated this
plan to provide benefits to its employees

9

and their beneficiaries. The plan shall
be maintained for the exclusive benefit of
eligible
employees
and
their
beneficiaries."
The plan is talking about eligibility. It says, "The program of benefits is
provided to all permanent
full-time
employees working an average of 3 0 hours a
week." In talking about who is eligible
it says, "You will be covered under the
plan
provided
you meet
eligibility
requirements provided below," and lists a
bunch. And it talks about in terms of:
An employee is this, an employee is that.
Then it talks about when coverage
under this plan — when an employee,s
entitlement would end.
It's called
"employee termination of coverage." "The
coverage of any employee shall automatically terminate at midnight at the
earliest time indicated below." The first
one is on the date of termination of
employment.
Then it says, "Dependant's
coverage will cease on the date of the
termination of the employee's coverage."
So, your Honor, in light of the
affidavit that's been filed, Mr. Wolsey is
taking the position here in this court, in
sworn affidavit testimony where he says:
I'm not an employee of Pro Benefit. This
is the agreement under which he's entitled
to recover medical benefits, if he's
entitled to them at all. The agreement
says it only applies to employees. So as
a matter of contract law he has no right
to recover any benefits from anybody if he
takes the position as he has that he's not
an employee. So for that reason, certainly it ought to be sufficient for the court
to throw this case out and grant summary
judgment. (R. 251-253).
summing up, counsel for Intercare stated:
So, your Honor, I think that the easy
answer to this, is the plaintiff is
saying: I want benefits under this plan,
but I'm really not an employee. And then

10

the plan says that if you're not an
employee you're not entitled to any
benefits. So he has no case.
But if he's going to retreat from
that position then he has to say: Yeah,
I'm entitled to benefits under that plan,
and maybe I am an employee under that
plan. And if he is, then ERISA applies and
ERISA preemption, and the case should be
dismissed. In any event, the case should
be dismissed by this court and Mr. Wolsey
can look at whatever remedies he has in
the federal court.
But I submit if your Honor dismissed
it on the first ground, that would be a
dismissal with prejudice and that would be
a proper thing to do. And I think under
sworn testimony he's saying: I'm not an
employee. And the contract says if you're
not an employee, you've got no coverage.
(R. 257).
Since it was Intercare's motion, counsel for Intercare had
the right to open and conclude the argument.

He opened the

argument asking for a dismissal with prejudice and concluded
the argument the same way.

Counsel stated:

The case that his
[plaintiff's]
counsel cites are just totally inapplicable in this case. Whether he's [T. Mark
Wolsey] technically a common-law employee
or whether he isn't is not the issue. The
issue is what did he represent himself to
be.
He represented himself to be an
employee so he could get the benefits of
this plan. If he wants the benefits of the
plan he better live with whatever drawbacks there may be to the very plan that
he premised his right of recovery.
I submit, your Honor, that he said —
he's represented to the court, and his
counsel has represented, that he's not an
employee.
The plan says if you're not,
you're entitled to no coverage.
This
court should, I submit, simply dismiss the

11

case with prejudice and we'll be done with
it. (R. 265).
9.

The medical benefit plan which Wolsey attached to his

affidavit only allows medical benefits to employees and their
dependents. If a person is not an employee of Pro-Benefit, the
person is not entitled to any medical benefits. The plan reads
in pertinent part:
The employer has initiated this plan to
provide benefits to its employees and
their beneficiaries. The Plan shall be
maintained for the exclusive benefit of
eligible employees and their beneficiaries. (R. 153) .
In defining who was eligible under the plan, the plan states:
This program of benefits is provided to
all permanent full-time employees working
an average of thirty (30) hours or more
per week. (R. 149).
The plan then talks about eligibility.

The plan specifies

repeatedly that, "employees will be eligible and employees7
dependents may be eligible if they meet certain criteria." (R.
149) .

The

plan

has

another

heading

entitled

"Employee

Termination of Coverage." This portion of the plan specifies:
The coverage of any employee shall automatically terminate at midnight at the
earliest time indicated below:
1.
On the date of termination of
employment; . . . (R. 148-147).
The plan also has another heading entitled "Dependent Termination of Coverage."

It states:

Dependents' coverage shall automatically
cease at midnight at the earliest time
indicated below:
12

1.
On the date of termination of
employee's coverage. (R. 147).
10.

After argument took place, Judge Christensen took the

matter under advisement.

(R. 200). Later, after considering

and rejecting plaintiff's objection to the form of the proposed
judgment because it would have the effect of dismissing the
case

with

entered

prejudice

an

order

(R.

201-204,

dismissing

plaintiffs7

against Intercare with prejudice.
11.

211), Judge

Christensen

amended

complaint

(R. 207).

Although plaintiffs' counsel objected to the form of

the judgment which Judge Christensen signed, on September 9,
1992, counsel did not object to the fact that no Rule 54(b)
determination had been made with respect to the judgment.

(R.

204) .
12.

After the September 9, 1992 judgment was entered,

plaintiffs'
Although

counsel

plaintiffs

then
argued

sought
the

to

amend

judgment

the

should

judgment.
be

without

prejudice, as opposed to with prejudice, they never sought to
amend the judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and they never asked Judge Christensen to certify
the judgment as final for purposes of appeal.

(R. 219, 222).

Pro-Benefits Staffing, Inc.
13.

On January 14, 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion to

amend their complaint to assert claims against Pro-Benefit.
(R. 23).
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14.

Plaintiffs' motion to amend was granted on February

11, 1992, and Pro-Benefit was then officially a party to the
action.
15.

(R. 176) .
Although no notice was given to defendant's counsel

of actions taken by plaintiffs, the record reveals that on
March 19, 1992, plaintiffs filed an ex parte verified motion
seeking service by publication on Pro-Benefit.
motion was granted on March 30, 1992.
was subsequently served by mail.
16.

(R. 188) . This

(R. 192).

Pro-Benefit

(R. 194).

On September 15, 1992, plaintiffs 7 counsel filed a

two-page pleading entitled Precipe Upon Default and Default
Certificate.

Although no notice of this pleading was given to

Intercare's counsel at the time, the record reflects that Judge
Christensen signed a default certificate on that same day,
September 15, 1992.
17.

(R. 217, 216).

No judgment or final order of any kind has been

entered against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.
18.

On November 10, 1992, an notice of appeal was filed

from the September 9, 1992 judgment, notwithstanding the fact
that the judgment did not dispose of all claims against all
parties, and notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs' claims
against Pro-Benefit remain pending and unresolved.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiffs purport
to appeal from a nonfinal judgment.

The judgment did not

dispose of all of plaintiffs' claims

against

14

all parties.

Plaintiffs'

claims

against

co-defendant

Pro-Benefit

remain

pending. Plaintiffs never sought a Rule 54(b) determination by
the trial court which would allow them to properly appeal this
case.

Because the judgment in this case has not been certified

as final by the trial court, the appeal must be dismissed.
In

the

district

court

plaintiffs

opposed

defendants

motion for summary judgment by vigorously arguing that their
claims were not preempted by ERISA.

No other arguments were

made by plaintiffs in opposition to summary judgment.
appeal, plaintiffs reverse themselves
their claims are preempted by ERISA.

and

Now, on

acknowledge

that

Plaintiffs now advance

entirely new arguments in,an attempt to overturn the judgment
of the trial court, all of which are unique to this appeal.
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized that they
will

not consider

appeal.

The

arguments

district

raised

court's

for the

judgment

must

first time

on

therefore

be

affirmed.
Plaintiffs7 complaint is without merit and fails to state
a cause of action because all of the claims contained in the
complaint

are

acknowledged.

preempted

by

ERISA,

as

plaintiffs

have

now

Consequently the trial court had no choice but

to dismiss plaintiffs 7 complaint on the merits with prejudice.
Plaintiffs claim that once it was determined that ERISA
preempted the state law claims, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case, and could only
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
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This argument is

erroneous for two reasons.

First, ERISA expressly provides

that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over disputed
benefits under an ERISA plan.

Second, plaintiffs7 complaint

does not contain an ERISA claim, but rather contains only state
law claims over which the district court obviously has jurisdiction.
Despite being alerted to the fact that their claims were
preempted by ERISA, plaintiffs nonetheless refused to add an
ERISA claim to their amended complaint.

Instead plaintiffs

chose to rely exclusively upon common law claims that allowed
for the recovery of punitive damages.

Now that their common

law claims have been dismissed for lack of merit, plaintiffs
seek to start over by filing a new complaint in federal court
based upon ERISA.

This is inappropriate.

Under the doctrine

of res judicata, plaintiffs must bring all of their possible
claims in a single action.

Those claims not contained in the

initial action are forever barred.
In addition to the foregoing, summary judgment is also
appropriate in light of the admissions made by plaintiffs.
Wolsey previously admitted in his sworn affidavit that he was
not an employee of Pro-Benefit.

The employee benefit plan at

the center of this dispute limits its coverage to individuals
who are employees. Conseguently plaintiffs' complaint fails to
state a claim as a matter of law.

For this reason plaintiffs

are now attempting to withdraw their prior admission.

The

doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents plaintiffs from doing
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so.

Summary judgment in favor of Intercare was therefore

appropriate.
Plaintiffs7 claims are also barred by the doctrine of
waiver.

Plaintiffs knowingly filed a complaint and an amended

complaint asserting only state law claims in an effort to
obtain punitive damages. Plaintiffs refused to assert a claim
for ERISA, despite being alerted in Intercare's Answer to the
fact that ERISA preempted all state law claims. By electing to
only pursue state law claims, plaintiffs waived their right to
assert a claim under ERISA.

In a similar manner, plaintiffs

have also waived their right to assert that Wolsey is an
employee of Pro-Benefit. By stating repeatedly that Wolsey was
not an employee, plaintiffs have waived their right to now
argue that Wolsey was an employee.
Despite the fact that plaintiffs' lawsuit was pending
against

defendant

Intercare

for

one

year

before

Judge

Christensen dismissed the case with prejudice, plaintiffs
adduced no evidence establishing any liability on behalf of
Intercare.

The affidavit filed by Beardall, President of

Intercare, was unrefuted.

That affidavit clearly establishes

that Intercare was not an insurer of plaintiffs, entered into
no contracts with plaintiffs, was not obligated to provide
benefits to plaintiffs, and simply acted as a claims processor.
To the extent plaintiffs had viable claims of any kind, those
claims were against Pro-Benefit, and not against Intercare.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL
DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL CLAIMS OF ALL PARTIES, IT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL JUDGMENT AND THIS COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW IT.
Appeals can only be taken from final judgments.

See Utah

R. App. P. 3(a). The judgment in this case was not certified
as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although plaintiffs' counsel objected to the initial entry of
the judgment and then sought to amend or modify the judgment,
plaintiffs' counsel never suggested to the trial court that the
judgment should be certified under Rule 54(b).

Therefore, the

judgment is not final and no appeal lies to this court.
In Crosland v. Peck. 738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987), plaintiff
Lawrence Crosland brought a lien foreclosure action against
defendants Novella Jane Crosland and Gerald and Diann Peck.
Crosland then moved for summary judgment against Novella and
the Pecks. The Pecks filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
against Crosland. The trial court denied Crosland's motion for
summary judgment, granted the Pecks' motion, and dismissed
Crosland's complaint on the merits and with prejudice as to the
Pecks.

Crosland then appealed from that order.

The Supreme Court determined that the appeal was not from
a final order and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The Court

acknowledged that the trial court's order fully decided issues
between the Pecks and Crosland, but stated there were still
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parties and issues before the trial court, and there was no
Rule

54(b)

certification

that

constituted a final judgment.

the

judgment

appealed

from

The Court stated:

While the trial court's order may have
qualified for certification under Rule
54(b), there was no reason for delay, nor
was there an express certification in the
record.
Therefore, the order appealed
from is not a final judgment for purposes
of appeal.
Williams v. State. 716 P.2d
806 (Utah 1986); All Weather Insulation,
Inc. v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d
1176 (Utah 1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel
Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). No motion
was made under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure for an interlocutory
appeal. Therefore, the appeal not being
properly brought before the court, it is
ordered dismissed. Id.
Steck

v.

Aagaire,

789

P.2d

708

(Utah

controlling Utah Supreme Court precedent.

1990),

is

a

The Steck case

consisted of three wrongful death cases consolidated at the
district court.
court

Summary judgment was entered at the district

level disposing

of all claims of Patsy

Heaton, heirs of one of the decedents.
appealed.

and

Wendell

The Heatons then

The Court noted that all claims they asserted had

been disposed

of, and that in another of the consolidated

cases, all claims of the heirs of passenger Dr. Richard Chase
had likewise been concluded by settlement.

But the Court noted

that claims in the third consolidated case brought by other
heirs remained

pending

in the district

court.

The Court

further observed that the summary judgment appealed from had
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not been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b).
In dismissing the appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held as
follows:
We adopt the
Circuit Court
United States,
1984). In that

rationale of the Ninth
of Appeals in Huene v.
743 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
case, the court said:

In our view, the best approach is to
permit the appeal only when there is
a final judgment that resolves all of
the consolidated actions unless a
54(b) certification is entered by the
district court.
This leaves the
discretion with the court which is
best able to evaluate the affect
[sic] of an interim appeal on the
parties
and
on
the
expeditious
resolution of the entire action.
743 F.2d at 705.
Because the judgment appealed does
not dispose of all claims of all parties
in the consolidated case, it does not
constitute a final judgment, and this
court has no jurisdiction to review it.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Id.
709.
A number of other Utah cases could be cited, all of which
stand for the proposition that a judgment such as the one
rendered in this case is not final for purposes of appeal, and
the appellate court
appeal.
P.2d

765

is therefore obligated

to dismiss the

See for example, Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 692
(Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v.

Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Sneddon v. Graham,
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821

P.2d

1185

(Utah

Ct. App.

1991);

Bennion

v.

Pennzoil

Company. 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992).
In this case, the appeal should be dismissed because the
trial court did not certify the September 9, 1992 judgment as
final under Rule 54(b), plaintiffs made no effort to obtain
such a certification, and the judgment does not dispose of all
claims against all parties, given the fact that plaintiffs'
lawsuit against Pro-Benefit remains pending in the trial court.
POINT II,
THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BRIEF WERE
NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
At the trial level, defendant Intercare moved for summary
judgment on the basis that all of the claims contained in
plaintiffs7 complaint were preempted by ERISA.

Plaintiffs1

only argument in opposition to defendant's motion was that
plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by ERISA because Wolsey
was not an employee of Pro-Benefit.

No other arguments were

made.
Now, on appeal, plaintiffs are attempting to abandon their+
prior argument in favor of new contradictory arguments.
their brief
preemption

plaintiffs

"withdraw their

of their claim,"

objection

and then proceed

to

In

ERISA

to make new

arguments that were never raised at the trial level, i.e.,
ERISA does indeed apply, the district court lacked jurisdiction, estoppel is inapplicable.
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This is inappropriate.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
defenses, claims, and issues not raised at the trial level
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.

See

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983); Pratt v.
City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 173 (Utah 1981). This general rule
applies to appeals from lower court rulings on summary judgment
motions.

See e.g., Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341-42

(Utah 1983); Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214, 215 (Utah
1981); Cleqg v. Lee. 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973).
Plaintiffs "did not . . . raise [their new issues] before the
trial court and [have] therefore waived any right to present
them on appeal."

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,

800-01 (Utah 1991) .
The

arguments

raised

in plaintiffs' brief

presented to the trial court.

were not

In light of the foregoing

authorities, plaintiffs' new issues should not be considered
and this Court should affirm the trial court's award of summary
judgment to defendant.
POINT III,
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT
PREJUDICE WAS PROPER.
Despite

controlling

cases

OF DISMISSAL WITH

which

were

set

forth

in

Intercare's memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment, plaintiffs nonetheless argued to the trial court that
ERISA was inapplicable and based their case on common law
claims.

They lost that argument at the trial court and have
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abandoned that argument on appeal.

They are now critical of

Judge Christensen for dismissing their common law claims with
prejudice even though that is the only ground upon which they
pursued the case below.
Plaintiffs' sole contention on appeal is that the trial
court should have dismissed their lawsuit without prejudice
rather than with prejudice even though the claims they made and
arguments they asserted at the trial court level required the
judge to do just what he did.

Plaintiffs' argument on appeal

is without merit for a number of reasons, each of which are
discussed below:
A.

All of Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Were Preempted
by ERISA and Therefore Dismissal With Prejudice Was
Required,

For the first time on appeal, plaintiffs "concede that
. . . [the] Pro-Benefit

. . . employee plan

within the bounds of federal ERISA protection."
Brief, p. 5 ) .

(Plaintiffs7

Consequently, all of plaintiffs7

claims are preempted by ERISA.
1144(b)(2).

[falls]

state law

See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1144(a),

See also. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.

41 (1986) ; Carter v. Amax Coal Corp. , 748 F. Supp. 812 (D. Utah
1990).

Plaintiffs now acknowledge this fact.

Because plain-

tiff's claims are preempted by ERISA, their complaint fails to
state a cause of action as a matter of law.

The trial court

therefore had no choice but to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on
the merits with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice was appro-
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priate because the complaint lacked merit and failed to state
a claim.
The foregoing analysis is supported by this Court's recent
decision in Demond v. FHP, 849 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1993).

In

Demond the plaintiff was insured under an employee welfare
benefit plan governed by ERISA. When a coverage dispute arose,
the plaintiff filed suit against the insurer in state court.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged breach of contract and other
state law claims, but did not allege any action under ERISA.
Consequently

the

complaint.

On

trial

appeal

court
this

dismissed

Court

the

affirmed

plaintiffs'

the

dismissal,

stating that:
We find that in light of all the facts and
circumstances this insurance program is
[an] employee welfare benefit plan under
ERISA
and the trial
court
properly
dismissed the state common law claims.
Id. at 73.

See also, Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496

(Utah App. 1992).
Although the Demond opinion does not specifically state
that the case was dismissed with prejudice, it is clear that
the dismissal must have been with prejudice.

Rule 41(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Unless the court
in its order
for
dismissal
otherwise
specifies,
a[n]
[involuntary]
dismissal
under
this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon
the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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As in Demond, plaintiffs' complaint in this case asserts
only state law claims that are preempted by ERISA.

The trial

court was therefore forced to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on
the merits because plaintiffs failed to amend the complaint and
the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

This Court

should affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment, just
as it did in Demond.
B*

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs' Complaint With Prejudice,
1.

The Trial Court Had
Over ERISA Claims.

Concurrent

to

Dismiss

Jurisdiction

The primary argument raised in plaintiffs' brief is that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice.

In their own words, plaintiffs

allege that, "at the point at which a state court determines
that ERISA preempts a state claim, that court no longer has
jurisdiction other than the minimum necessary to direct the
dismissal of the claim without prejudice."
p. 5 ) .
and,

This allegation is an incorrect statement of the law

not

Contrary

(Plaintiffs' Brief,

surprisingly,
to

plaintiffs'

is

unsupported

assertions,

by

state

any

authority.

courts

are

not

deprived of jurisdiction the moment it is determined that ERISA
preempts a state claim.

Indeed, ERISA itself provides that

state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over these types of
ERISA cases:
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(a)

A civil action may be brought
(1)

—

By a participant or beneficiary
*

*

*

(B) to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan. . . .
*

*

*

(e)(1) except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section [quoted
above], the district courts of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions under this subchapter
brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.
State
courts of competent jurisdiction and
district courts of the United States shall
have concurrent jurisdiction of actions
under
subsection
(a) (1) (B)
of
this
section.
29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1132
(1985)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' complaint seeks benefits allegedly due to them
under the terms of an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.
Consequently, under the statute quoted above, the state court
had concurrent jurisdiction and was fully capable of dismissing
plaintiffs' claims on the merits.

See, e.g., White v. Enron

Corp., 686 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Imler v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co.. 650 P.2d 712, 714 (Kan. App. 1982).

The trial

court was not deprived of jurisdiction the moment it determined
that

the employee

benefit plan was governed

alleged by plaintiffs.
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by

ERISA,

as

Despite plaintiffs' suggestions to the contrary, concurrent state court jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the
federal government's goal of applying federal law in a uniform
manner:
Congress' enforcement scheme vests jurisdiction over most types of ERISA civil
actions exclusively in the federal courts.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits or
enforce rights under a plan, however, is
vested concurrently in state and federal
courts. Congress' choice to vest jurisdiction over one class of ERISA civil
actions in both the state and federal
courts is in no way inconsistent with its
intent to create a comprehensive scheme of
federal common law in the area. State as
well as federal courts may be dispositors
of federal law.
Moreover, Congress'
choice to grant the state courts concurrent jurisdiction over this particular
class of cases squares with its overall
legislative goals.
Actions to recover
benefits or enforce rights under the terms
of a plan will typically involve the
application of those general principles of
contract law with which the state courts
have had substantial experience before
ERISA; their expertise qualifies them to
evaluate these rules in the light of
ERISA's policies and apply federal common
law. Congress simply increased the number
of forums to which a claimant might have
access in these cases, presumably both to
increase the claimant's options and also
to mitigate to some degree the burden on
the federal courts resulting from ERISA.
Either party, of course, retains the right
of access to a federal forum in actions
ERISA governs irrespective of diversity of
citizenship or amount in controversy,
plaintiff by filing there, and defendant
by removing. Menhorn v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.. 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted; emphasis
added).
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2.

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction Because
Plaintiffs Asserted Only State Law Claims. Res
Judicata Prohibits Plaintiffs From Asserting a
New Claim Under ERISA.

In addition to the foregoing, there exists a more fundamental and compelling reason to reject plaintiffs7 argument
that the state court had no jurisdiction to dismiss ERISA
claims with prejudice. Neither plaintiffs' complaint nor their
amended

complaint

contain

an

ERISA

claim;

instead

these

complaints contain only common law causes of action. Certainly
the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs' state
law claims on the merits. ERISA is not involved because it was
not alleged by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' failure to assert a claim under ERISA was not
simply oversight, but was rather a calculated decision to
pursue only those theories that allow recovery of punitive
damages.

Punitive damages are not available under ERISA.

See

e.g. , O'Neil v. Gen Corp. , Inc. , 764 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. N.Y.
1991); Browning v. Grote Meat Co., 703 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Mo.
1988).

In its answer defendant alerted plaintiffs to the fact

that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by ERISA.
Fourth Defense).

(R. 18,

However, plaintiffs chose not to assert an

ERISA claim.

Indeed, only a few months later plaintiffs

amended

complaint

their

theories.

to

assert

additional

common

law

Plaintiffs did not add an ERISA claim to their

amended complaint.
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Shortly after plaintiffs

filed their proposed

amended

complaint, defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds
of

ERISA

preemption.

In

its

supporting

memorandum

filed

January 22, 1992, defendant again informed plaintiffs that
their common law causes of action were all preempted by ERISA.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs again elected to forego asserting an
ERISA

claim

and

instead

tried to preserve their

claim tc

punitive damages by arguing that their common law claims were
not preempted

by ERISA.

Oral argument on the motion for

summary judgment did not take place until June 19, 1992.

By

that time, plaintiffs still had made no attempt to assert ERISA
claims.
argued

At no time after the motion for summary judgment was
did

plaintiffs

seek

to add

an

ERISA

claim.

When

plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, they still had not
asserted any ERISA claims.

In short, despite numerous oppor-

tunities to do so, plaintiffs never asserted any ERISA claims
at the trial court level.
After pursuing their punitive damage and common law claims
as far as the law would allow, plaintiffs now wish to back up
and start over by filing a new complaint in federal court
relying solely upon ERISA.

This is entirely inappropriate.

The doctrine of res judicata requires a litigant to consolidate
all claims arising from a single transaction or occurrence into
a single action.

A plaintiff cannot file a separate complaint

for each cause of action he wishes to assert.

See e.g. f

Christian v. American Home Assurance Co. , 577 P.2d 899, 905
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(Okla. 1977); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559
P.2d 411, 413 (N.M. 1977).

The rule provides that all remedies

available to a plaintiff must be pursued in one action and "all
claims that could have been brought in the first action merge
in the judgment, regardless of whether the plaintiff actually
asserted those claims."
P.2d

1344, 1345

Wilson v. Western Alliance Corp.. 715

(Or. App. 1986).

See also. Penrod v. Nu

Creation Cream, Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983), Belliston
v. Texaco. Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1974); Wheadon v.
Pearson. 376 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Utah 1962); Allen v. McCurrv.
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

The effect of this rule is to preclude

parties from spreading their demands and prosecuting their
claims

piecemeal,

leaving

portions

to

subsequent suits if the first suit fails.

be

presented

in

See Leonard Farms.

559 P.2d at 413.
The test

for res

judicata

is found

in Fitzgerald

v.

Corbett, 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990):

In order for a claim to be barred by res
judicata, the current claim and a prior
claim must satisfy three elements:
(1)
both cases must involve the same parties,
their privies or assignees; (2) the claim
that is asserted to be barred must have
been presented or be such that it could
have been presented in the first case; and
(3) the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. Id. at 359
(emphasis added).
In the event that plaintiffs were to file a new complaint
under ERISA, all three elements of the res judicata test would
be satisfied.

First, the complaint would involve the same
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parties.

Second, the claim would involve an action under

ERISA, which could have (and should have) been presented in
this case.

Third, this case resulted in a final judgment

dismissing plaintiffs/ common law causes of action on the
merits because they were all preempted by federal law.
In light of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that
plaintiffs cannot file a new complaint asserting a claim under
ERISA.

Plaintiffs

are

similarly

complaint after a final dismissal.

unable

to

amend

their

See Nichols v. State, 554

P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1976); Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809, 81011 (Utah 1972) . Plaintiffs lost their right to assert an ERISA
claim when they made a calculated decision to pursue only state
law causes of action in the hopes of obtaining punitive
damages. Plaintiffs cannot pursue punitive damage theories and
then, when the theories fail, start over and pursue other
claims. This Court should affirm the award of summary judgment
to Intercare.
C.

summary Judgment Was Also Appropriate Based Upon the
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel.

Even if plaintiffs had decided to assert an ERISA claim in
their complaint, and even if, as plaintiffs allege, the state
district court was deprived of jurisdiction to dismiss the
ERISA claim with prejudice, Intercare would nonetheless have
been entitled to summary judgment.
At the trial level, Intercare's motion for summary judgment alleged that plaintiffs' claims failed to state a cause of
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action because they were preempted by ERISA.

In response

plaintiffs argued exclusively that ERISA did not apply because
Wolsey

was

not

an

employee

of

Pro-Benefit.

Plaintiffs

submitted an affidavit from Wolsey affirmatively alleging that
Wolsey was not an employee.

Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum

emphasized over and over again that Wolsey was not an employee
of Pro-Benefit.
In light of Wolsey's admission that he was not employed by
Pro-Benefit, Intercare's reply memorandum

pointed

out that

Intercare was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
because the medical benefits plan upon which all claims had to
be based only provided coverage for employees.
cally,

the

summary

plan

description

provides

More specifithat,

program of benefits is provided to all permanent

"This

full-time

employees working an average of thirty (3 0) hours or more per
week."

(R. 149). Based upon plaintiffs' repeated admissions

that Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit, the trial court
properly

concluded

that

plaintiffs

were

not

entitled

to

coverage under the employee benefit plan and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the merits.
On appeal plaintiffs are now attempting to

"withdraw"

their admission that Wolsey is not a Pro-Benefit employee.

Now

plaintiffs argue that their common law claims are preempted by
ERISA and that Wolsey jls a Pro-Benefit employee.

These argu-

ments directly contradict the arguments made by plaintiffs
before the trial court.
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Plaintiffs are estopped from contradicting their prior
sworn statement that Wolsey is not an employee of Pro-Benefit,
This court recently stated that parties are prohibited from
engaging in the type of legal gamesmanship employed by plaintiffs in this case:
Generally in legal proceedings a party
with knowledge of all the facts will not
be allowed to take a position, pursue that
position to fruition, and later, with no
substantial
change
in
circumstances,
return to attack the validity of the prior
position or the outcome flowing from it.
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220
(Utah App. 1990).

See also, Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 601 P.2d

589, 592 (Ariz. 1979) (estoppel prevents a party from taking an
inconsistent position in a subsequent judicial proceeding);
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d

491, 496

(Utah 1980)

(a person

taking a position in prior litigation and obtaining relief on
the basis of it cannot maintain an opposite position in a
subsequent action); Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 664 P. 2d
745, 751-52 (Hawaii App. 1983) (judicial estoppel prevents a
party from taking inconsistent positions during the course of
a judicial proceeding); Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co.. 829 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah App. 1992) (insured's claim
that an issue of fact existed precluded a later argument that
a subrogation claim was not fairly debatable and made in bad
faith); Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972)
(plaintiff could not assert that condemnation action was still
pending after previously asserting that the action was over).
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The doctrine of judicial estoppel is intended to prevent
a party from "playing fast and loose" with the court.

Citizens

Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co. , Inc. . 552 P.2d 796, 802
(N.M. App. 1976); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo.
1976).

The doctrine obviously applies in the instant case,

where Wolsey alleged first that he was not an employee of ProBenefit, but now asserts that he is.

An identical attempt was

made and rejected in Rowland v. Klies. 726 P. 2d 310 (Mont.
1986).
In Rowland, the plaintiff contracted to watch the defend a n t s properties in exchange for being allowed to live in one
of the defendants cabins.

The defendant later forced the

plaintiff to vacate the cabin and the plaintiff sued.

The

plaintiff's original complaint asserted many causes of action
and the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on some of
the claims.

In opposition to the defendant's motion, the

plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he was not
employed by the defendant.

After the motion was resolved the

plaintiff amended his complaint to assert a claim for breach of
employment contract and also a statutory claim for employer
deception.

Defendant then moved for summary judgment on these

claims on the grounds that the plaintiff was not an employee of
the defendant, as previously sworn by plaintiff in his own
affidavit.

The plaintiff opposed this motion by stating that

he was an employee.

The trial court granted summary judgment

and the plaintiff appealed.
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On appeal the Montana Supreme Court upheld the award of
summary judgment to the defendant.

In doing so, the court

stated that:
[A]fter appellant had filed his first
complaint but prior to the filing of the
amended complaint, appellant filed a sworn
affidavit
with
the
Jefferson
County
District Court clerk of court.
In that
affidavit, appellant swears that he was
not "employed" by respondent; that the use
of the word "hired" in his complaint was
not intended to be defined as hired in the
sense of an employer-employee relationship; that he was not hired as an employer
hires an employee. . . .
The district
court, in considering this affidavit,
stated that it "seems to me to work a
fraud upon the court for plaintiff to now
claim damages from any sort of employment
status." We also question the propriety
of allowing appellant to now assert that
there was an employment relationship.
The rule is well established that
during the course of litigation a party is
not permitted to assume or occupy inconsistent and contradictory positions, and
while this rule is frequently referred to
as "judicial estoppel," it more properly
is a rule which estops a party to play
fast and loose with the courts.
Although the rule may be regarded as
a form of estoppel, it is not strictly one
of estoppel, but partakes rather of
positive rules and procedure based on
manifest justice and, to a greater or
lesser degree, on considerations of the
orderliness, regularity, and expedition of
litigation.
Those elements such as reliance and
injury, or prejudice to the individual,
which are generally essential to the
operation of equitable estoppel, may not
enter into judicial estoppel, at least not
to the same extent. In order to work a
judicial estoppel, the position first
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assumed must have been taken knowingly and
free of inducement by the opposite party.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel
applies with particular force to admissions or statements made under sanction of
oath.
*

*

*

fP"|arties are bound by and estopped to
controvert admissions in their pleadings.
We find no reason why this rule should not
be extended, at least in the peculiar
context of this case, to estop a party
from controverting admissions in his
affidavit.
Especially where it appears
that appellant is shifting his position on
the issue of an employment relationship
simply to suit his legal maneuvering at
the time. . . .
We hold that appellant is estopped
from asserting that an employment relationship existed and summary judgment on the
first
two
claims
for
relief
was
appropriate.
Id.

at

315-16

(emphasis

added,

citations

and

quotations

omitted).
A similar result was reached in Harris v. Bailey, 798 P. 2d
96 (Mont. 1990).

In Harris, the plaintiff had previously

asserted that he was a tenured teacher.

Later, the plaintiff

argued that he was not a teacher under a particular state
statute.

The court refused to allow the plaintiff to change

his position and found for the defendant.
Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that Wolsey was
employed by Pro-Benefit.

In light of Wolsey's admission that

he was not Pro-Benefit's employee, this court should affirm the
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice because only
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employees are entitled to benefits under the employee benefit
plan at the heart of this dispute.
Plaintiffs discount their own admission and argue that
there is a factual dispute over whether Wolsey was an employee
of Pro-Benefit. Plaintiffs point to the affidavit of Beardall,
which states that Wolsey was employed by Pro-Benefit. However,
Beardall's

statement

is

based

solely

upon

the

documents

provided to him by Pro-Benefit, which identify Wolsey as an
employee.

Beardall does not have personal knowledge of the

relationship between Pro-Benefit and Wolsey and is therefore
unable to refute Wolsey's assertion that he is not an employee,
which assertion is based on personal knowledge.

Plaintiffs

recognized this fact and, during oral argument before the trial
court, moved for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of
law, Wolsey was not an employee of Pro-Benefit.

(R. 258-261).

Plaintiffs

cannot

and

rely

Beardall's

affidavit

fact

on

now reverse
to

their

create

an

position
issue

of

on
the

employment status of Wolsey.
Even if plaintiffs could create an issue of fact over
Wolsey's employment status, defendant would still have been
entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice. Wolsey's employment status does not change the
outcome of this case.

On the one hand, assuming that Wolsey

was a Pro-Benefit employee as is now alleged, ERISA would be
applicable to this case and would preempt all of the claims
asserted in plaintiffs' complaint.
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Since plaintiffs had ample

time and opportunity to assert ERISA claims at the trial level
but chose not to do so, the dismissal with prejudice was
clearly proper.

On the other hand, assuming that Wolsey was

not a Pro-Benefit employee as originally alleged, plaintiffs
would be excluded from benefits under the employee benefit plan
because Wolsey was not employed by Pro-Benefit.

Under either

scenario, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to
Intercare by dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should not have
decided whether plaintiffs were entitled to benefits under the
benefit plan because the issue was not raised until Intercare
filed its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment.
This argument lacks merit. Plaintiffs opened the door to this
argument when they asserted repeatedly and exhaustively in
their opposing memorandum, that Wolsey was not an employee of
Pro-Benefit.
even

if

Intercare was certainly entitled to show that,

plaintiffs'

assertion

was

true,

nonetheless entitled to summary judgment.
purpose for a reply memorandum.

defendant

was

This is the exact

If plaintiffs felt that they

had grounds to refute Intercare's reply memorandum, they could
have done so by requesting permission to file a supplemental
memorandum

or

by

pleading

their

case

at

oral

argument.

However, plaintiffs did not request permission to file a
supplemental memorandum and, at oral argument, were unable to
suggest a single reason why they should prevail on their common
law claims.

Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the issues
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presented in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were all
properly before and properly decided by the district court,
D.

Plaintiffs' Claimed
Waiver.

is Barred by the Doctrine of

Plaintiffs' claims are also barred by the doctrine of
waiver.

"Waiver exists where a party has a right, knows of

that right, and through its objective conduct evidences an
intent to waive that right regardless of some privately-held
intention

to

the

contrary."

Vali

Convalescent

&

Care

Institutions v. Div. of Healthcare Financing, 797 P.2d 438
(Utah App. 1990) (emphasis removed, citation omitted).
In the instant case plaintiffs were alerted to the fact
that ERISA preempted all of their state law claims.

Nonethe-

less plaintiffs made a calculated decision to proceed with
their state law claims in the hopes of recovering punitive
damages.

By making this decision plaintiffs have waived their

right to assert a claim under ERISA.
In a similar manner plaintiffs have also waived their
right to argue that Mark Wolsey was employed by Pro-Benefit.
Plaintiffs initially alleged that Wolsey was not employed by
Pro-Benefit in order to proceed with their state law claims.
Plaintiffs knew that, by making this argument, they would lose
whatever rights they had to recover under ERISA.
plaintiffs

proceeded

with

recover punitive damages.

their

argument

Nonetheless

in an effort

to

By so proceeding plaintiffs have
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waived their right to now argue that Wolsey was an employee
under an ERISA plan.
E.

No Disputed Issues of Material Fact Exist,

There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the
liability of Intercare. Evidence set forth in the affidavit of
Beardall was unrefuted despite the fact that judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Intercare was not rendered
until one year after plaintiffs filed their complaint.

In his

affidavit, Beardall clearly states that Intercare is not an
insurance company, it never issued any kind of insurance policy
to plaintiffs, and it never entered into any contract with
plaintiffs.

The affidavit establishes that Intercare was

simply acting as a contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit's
employee medical benefit plan, but that Pro-Benefit was the
administrator of the plan and any monies paid would be paid
pursuant to the self-insured plan.
The summary plan description attached to Wolsey7s own
affidavit establishes that the Pro-Benefit employee benefit
plan is a self-funded plan (R. 152), it establishes that the
plan administrator is Pro-Benefit and that the excess insurance
carrier is Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. (R. 113). It
states that the plan is administered by the plan administrator,
and that Intercare is merely a claims processor.

(R. 112) .

The claims processing service agreement attached to the
affidavit

of Beardall

likewise establishes that the role

Intercare assumed was to prepare paperwork and process claims.
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The

plan

sponsor

was

defined

as

Pro-Benefit.

(R.

104) .

Intercare was not given any discretionary authority or control
respecting the management of trust funds.

(R. 103). Intercare

assumed no responsibility, risk, liability, or obligation for
the funding of the medical benefit plan.
At

oral

argument

on

Intercare's

(R. 102).
motion

for

summary

judgment, plaintiffs7 counsel did not dispute the above points.
In fact, when the court asked plaintiffs' counsel how Intercare
was involved, plaintiffs' counsel responded, "As outlined in my
memo we don't know the true relationship of this and discovery
is continuing.

We would allege at this time they're part of

the insurance company.

We need discovery on that."

(R. 260).

The district court was still troubled by what evidence
plaintiff had implicating Intercare, and therefore later in
argument posed the following question to plaintiffs' counsel,
"Well,

I'm

trying to understand

how you get to

Intercare

benefits." Counsel responded, "That's what we have to continue
to discover is that they are claiming they acted as an administrative agency.
their role was."

We have yet to have facts as to exactly what
(R. 262).

There are no facts which would validate plaintiffs' theory
of recovery
pending

against Intercare.

before

judgment

was

In the year the case was

entered,

nothing to the court on this point.

plaintiffs

presented

In addition to the other

reasons cited, the trial court's judgment can certainly be
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affirmed on the basis that no genuine issues of material fact
existed as to Intercare's liability•
CONCLUSION
This case should be summarily dismissed because jurisdiction in this court is lacking and because plaintiffs' brief
raises new issues on appeal.
If the case is decided on the merits, summary judgment
entered by Judge Cullen Christensen should be affirmed•

All of

the claims contained in plaintiffs' complaint are preempted by
ERISA.

The court had

jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs'

complaint with prejudice and res judicata prevents plaintiffs'
from commencing a new action against Intercare.

Plaintiffs'

claims are also barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel
and waiver.
Additionally, Judge Christensen's summary judgment was
proper because plaintiffs proffered no evidence suggesting that
Intercare should be found liable to plaintiffs.
Intercare therefore urges the Court to affirm

summary

judgment in its favor.
Dated this

J

day of June, 1993.
STRONG & HANNI

•> (kMh—
David R. Nielson
Attorneys for DefendantAppellee
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Rule 2

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 2. Suspension of rules.
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or provisions of
any of these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case
in accordance with its direction.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is
added to the list of those rules that the appellate court may not suspend. The former list of
rules t h a t the appellate court could not suspend concerned procedures and time limits
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial

court. If the motions are not filed in a timely
manner, the appellant may not take advantage
of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the disposition of the motion to file the appeal. Both
appellate courts treat the failure to file postjudgment motions in a timely manner as a jurisdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Timely filing.
When a motion for summary disposition was
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen-

sion of the time limitation contained in Rule
10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams. 798 P.2d
1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of p a r t i e s . The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
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(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
Advisory Committee Note. — The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal appellate
courts
The rule is amended to make clear t h a t the
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees But for the

order of filing, the cross-appellant would have
been the appellant and so should be required to
pay the established fees
Cros9-References. — Circuit courts, appeals from, § 78-4-11.
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120.
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
where the alleged error was not made part of
the record Powers v Gene's Bldg Materials,
Inc , 567 P 2d 174 (Utah 1977).

ANALYSIS

Absence of record
Attorney fees
Denial of intervention
Dismissal by trial court
Filing fees
Filing of notice
Final order or judgment
J u d g m e n t nunc pro tunc
Motion to strike
New trial
Partial judgment
Postjudgment orders
Purpose of notice
Review in equity cases
Summary judgment
Unsigned minute entry
Cited

Attorney fees.
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
without the necessity of having to file a cross
appeal Coates v American Economy Ins Co ,
627 P 2d 92 (Utah 1981), Walhs v Thomas,
632 P 2 d 39 (Utah 1981)
Denial of intervention.
Order denying with prejudice an application
for intervention was appealable Tracy v University of Utah Hosp , 619 P 2d 340 (Utah
1980)

A b s e n c e of record.
There was nothing for the court to review

Dismissal by trial court.
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb),
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eree's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914.
Power of successor or substituted master or
rower ot successor or substituted master or
referee to render decision or enter judgment on
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079
Referee's failure to file report within time

specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
^ ^ a r e " e x c e P t i o n a l conditions" justifying
r e f e r e n c e u n d e r R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e dure 53(b),
I A T P Yed 922
R e y ^umb^a*. — Equity •» 393 to 395, 401,
404 to 406; Reference «=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99
et seq.

PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) J u d g m e n t u p o n multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more t h a n one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) J u d g m e n t by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To w h o m awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) H o w a s s e s s e d . The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
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whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), UtahR.App.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, Rule 40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs,
S 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary,
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Appealability.
—Attorney's fee award.

—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
—Review of finality.
—Separate claim.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on unpleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.
Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
A b s e n c e o f e x p r e s s determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
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Note 4
employee and employer over profit sharing
plan, enforcement of the provisions of the
plan could not be barred by this chapter.

Ch. 18

Knollmeyer v. Rudco Industries, Inc., 1977,
381 A.2d 378, 154 N.J.Super. 309.

Part 5—Administration and Enforcement
§ 1131.

Criminal penalties

Any person who willfully violates any provision of part 1 of this subtitle,
or any regulation or order issued under any such provision, shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; except that in the case of such violation by a person not an
individual, the fine imposed upon such person shall be a fine not exceeding
$100,000.
(Pub.L. 93-406, Title I, § 501, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 891.)
Historical Note
Promulgation of Regulations. Secretary
authorised, effective Sept. 2, 1974, to promulgate regulations wherever provisions of this
subchapter call for the promulgation of regulations, see section 1031 of this title.

Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of Pub.L. 93-406, see 1974 U.S.
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 4639.

Cross References
ReliajT-^ on administrative interpretations as defense to prosecutions under this section, see
section 1028 of this title.

West's Federal Forms
Sentence and fme, see § 7531 et seq.

§ 1132.

Civil enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title; . rP p^r< ^
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(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by
the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision
of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i)
of this section.
(b) Plans qualified under Internal Revenue Code; maintenance of actions
involving delinquent contributions

(1) In the case of a plan which is qualified under section 401(a), 403(a),
or 405(a) of Title 26 (or with respect to which an application to so qualify
has been filed and has not been finally determined) the Secretary may
exercise his authority under subsection (a)(5) of this section with respct l to
a violation of, or the enforcement of, parts 2 and 3 of this subtitle (relating
to participation, vesting, and funding), only if—
(A) requested by the Secretary of the Treasury, or
(B) one or more participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries, of such
plan request in writing (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe
by regulation) that he exercise such authority on their behalf. In the
case of such a request under this paragraph he may exercise such
authority only if he determines that such violation affects, or such
enforcement is necessary to protect, claims of participants or beneficiaries to benefits under the plan.
(2) The Secretary shall not initiate an action to enforce section 1145 of
this title.
(c) Administrator's refusal to supply requested information

Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any
information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to
furnish to a participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results
from matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing
the material requested to the last known address of the requesting participant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the court's
discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the
amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and the
court may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper.
(d) Status of employee benefit plan as entity

(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as
an entity. Service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of a court
upon a trustee or an administrator of an employee benefit plan in his
capacity as such shall constitute service upon the employee benefit plan. In
a case where a plan has not designated in the summary plan description of
the plan an individual as agent for the service of legal process, service upon
the Secretary shall constitute such service. The Secretary, not later than 15
days after receipt of service under the preceding sentence, shall notify the
administrator or any trustee of the plan of receipt of such service.
(2) Any money judgment under this subchapter against an employee
benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall
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not be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such
person is established in his individual capacity under this subchapter
(e) Jurisdiction

(1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the
district courts of the United States shall have exclusive junsdiction of civil
actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary State courts of competent jurisdiction and district
courts of the United States shall have concurrent junsdiction of actions
under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
(2) Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court of
the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is
administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or
may be found, and process may be served in any other district where a
defendant resides or may be found
(f) Amount in controversy; citizenship of parties

The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, without
respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to
grant the relief provided for in subsection (a) of this section in any action
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving
delinquent contributions

(1) In any action under this subchapter (other than an action described in
paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either
party
(2) In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on behalf of
a plan to enforce section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of
the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan—
(A) the unpaid contributions,
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,
(C) an amount equal to the greater of—
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an
amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as
may be permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount
determined by the court under subparagraph (A),
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by
the defendant, and
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropnate
For purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid contributions shall be
determined by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate
prescnbed under section 6621 of Title 26
(h) Service upon Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Treasury

A copy of the complaint in any action under this subchapter by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (other than an action brought by one or
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more participants or beneficiaries under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section
which is solely for the purpose of recovering benefits due such participants
under the terms of the plan) shall be served upon the Secretary and the
Secretary of the Treasury by certified mail. Either Secretary shall have the
right in his discretion to intervene in any action, except that the Secretary of
the Treasury may not intervene in any action under part 4 of this subtitle.
If the Secretary brings an action under subsection (a) of this section on
behalf of a participant or beneficiary, he shall notify the Secretary of the
Treasury.
(i) Administrative assessment of civil penalty

In the case of a transaction prohibited by section 1106 of this title by a
party in interest with respect to a plan to which this part applies, the
Secretary may assess a civil penalty against such party in interest. The
amount of such penalty may not exceed 5 percent of the amount involved
(as defined in section 4975(f)(4) of Title 26); except that if the transaction is
not corrected (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulation,
which regulations shall be consistent with section 4975(f)(5) of Title 26)
within 90 days after notice from the Secretary (or such longer period as the
Secretary may permit), such penalty may be in an amount not more than
100 percent of the amount involved. This subsection shall not apply to a
transaction with respect to a plan described in section 4975(e)(1) of Title 26.
(j) Direction and control of litigation by Attorney General

In all civil actions under this subchapter, attorneys appointed by the
Secretary may represent the Secretary (except as provided in section 518(a)
of Title 28), but all such litigation shall be subject to the direction and
control of the Attorney General.
(k) Jurisdiction of actions against the Secretary of Labor

Suits by an administrator, fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary of an
employee benefit plan to review a final order of the Secretary, to restrain the
Secretary from taking any action contrary to the provisions of this chapter,
or to compel him to take action required under this subchapter, may be
brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the
plan has its principal office, or in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.
(Pub.L. 93-406, Title I, § 502, Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 891; Pub.L. 96-364, Title III,
§ 306(b), Sept. 26, 1980, 94 Stat. 1295.)
1

So in original. Probably should be "respect".
Historical Note

References in Text. This subchapter, referred to in subsecs. (a)(3), (5), (c) to (e), (g),
(h), (j)» and (k), was in the original "this
title", meaning Title I of Pub.L. 93-406,
which enacted this subchapter and amended
section 5108 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, and sections 664,
1027 and 1954 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. For complete classification of
Title I of Pub.L. 93-406, see Tables volume.

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (k), was
in the original "this Act", meaning Pub.L.
93-406, known as the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. Titles I, III,
and IV of such Act are classified principally
to this chapter. For complete classification
of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note
set out under section 1001 of this title and
Tables volume.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY
CASE NUMBER:

Plaintiff,

910400630

RULING

vs.
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, et al
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on
the motion of Def Intercare Benefit Systems seeking Summary
Judgment.

The Court has reviewed the file, considered the

memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon
being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Said motion is granted.
If, as PI contends in his affidavit, he has never

been an employee of Def Pro-Benefit, PI would not be entitled to
benefits as a matter of contract.

Under such circumstances, PI

would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which should
preclude any recovery.
If the documents upon which PI bases his claims are
accurate, then PI was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit and Pi's
claims are preempted by ERISA rules and regulations.
Dated this

*/

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE
cc:

Danielle Ferron, Esq.
Jackson B. Howard, Esq,
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq.

Robert A. Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
and
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3017
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,
Plaintiffs,

J U D G M E N T

vs.

Civil No. 910400630

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendant.

Defendant Intercare Benefit Systemsf motion for summary
judgment came on for hearing before the court on June 19, 1992,
at 11:00 A.M.

Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys,

Jackson B. Howard and Danielle Ferron.

Defendant Intercare

Benefit Systems was represented by its attorneys, Robert A.
Burton and Wesley C. Argyle.

The court having reviewed the

filef considered memoranda of counsel, entertained argument
of counsel, and being fully advised, grants defendant
Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion and finds as follows:
If, as plaintiff contends in his affidavit, he has
never been an employee of defendant Pro-Benefit, plaintiff
would not be entitled to benefits as a matter of contract.
Under such circumstances, plaintiff would certainly have been a
party to a sham or fraud which would preclude any recovery.
If the documents upon which plaintiff bases his claim
are accurate, then plaintiff was in fact an employee of ProBenefit and plaintiff's claims are preempted by ERISA rules and
regulations.
Based upon the foregoing findings and in light of sworn
testimony given by plaintiff in his affidavit,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's amended complaint against Intercare

Benefit Systems be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems be and hereby

is awarded judgment in its favor and against plaintiff, T. Mark
Wolsey, no cause of action.
Dated this

tf

day of ^ ^ J ^ J ^

BY THE COURT:

, 1992.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 1992,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment,
first-class postage affixed, to:
Jackson Howard
Danielle M. Ferron
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North Street
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84 603
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